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Endogenous lifetime, intergenerational mobility  
and economic development 
 




This paper analyzes the interactions among lifetime, intergenerational mobility and economic 
development in overlapping generations framework. In addition, we explain the mechanism that 
causes two motions of intergenerational mobility, monotonous motion and cyclical motion, which 
are observed in empirical studies. We show that these motions of mobility depend crucially on 
lifetime. We assume that lifetime increases through health effect with economic development. 
Increasing lifetime encourages incentives of education investment while decreasing transfer, 
which is the funding source for education. If lifetime slowly increases sufficiently, mobility 
monotonically increases while income inequality decreases. However, if lifetime increases rapidly 
with economic development, the economy exhibits cyclical and even chaotic behavior. Even if 
we consider that differential lifetime between the educated and the uneducated, we get two 
motions of mobility: monotonous and cyclical motion. 
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1. Introduction 
Two motions of intergenerational mobility have been shown in empirical studies. While 
Jin et al. (2019) find that mobility has non-monotonically changed in China, Bratberg et al. (2007) 
show the mobility has monotonically increased in Norway. However, few theoretical studies 
explain the difference between these motions. The seminal work by Maoz and Moav (1999) 
provides a simple, but useful framework in analyzing the relationship between income inequality 
and intergenerational mobility. They show that the economy monotonically approaches the steady 
state with a decrease in income inequality between the educated and uneducated. Galor and 
Tsiddon (1997) analyze the effect of technological progress on mobility, income inequality, and 
economic growth. Iyigun (1999) and Davies et al. (2005) discuss that the type of education 
system—public or private—is an important factor in determining upward-mobility. Fan and 
Zhang (2013) show the economy converges to a unique equilibrium under the private education 
system while multiple equilibria may exist under the public education system. As Owen and Weil 
(1998) also points out, parental support or self-financing, with or without a liquidity constraint, is 
also an issue to be analyzed. Galor and Zeira (1993) focus on the imperfect capital market. They 
indicate that upward mobility is hindered by high borrowing costs; as a result, multiple equilibria 
emerge in the economy. Using the Maoz and Moav model, Murayama (2019) analyzes how 
government transfers affect intergenerational mobility and growth. He shows that larger transfers 
to children with higher ability foster upward mobility and growth if the economy has low income 
inequality. 
 Many previous studies on intergenerational mobility show monotonous motion of 
mobility. In contrast, we show various motions of mobility and income inequality focusing on 
endogenous lifetime. As has been indicated by many studies and historical data, economic 
development increases lifetime by improving nutrition and sanitation. Similarly, lifetime is 
general important in determining economic growth (e.g., Cervellati and Sunde 2005; Chen 2010; 
Fanti and Gori 2014).1 Lifetime affects the mobility and economic development through changes 
in household economic behavior, such as savings and educational investment. This suggests that 
 
1 In empirical studies, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) show the negative relationship between lifetime 
and per capita GDP. In contrast, Cervellati and Sunde (2011) show that the negative relationship between 
lifetime and per capita GDP is changed with demographic transition. 
lifetime, intergenerational mobility, and economic development have a high degree of 
interdependence. Lifetime is expected to play a crucial role in the mobility if they are considered 
in the context of economic growth.2  
 In this study, we analyze the effects on the mobility, income inequality, and economic 
development incorporating endogenous lifetime into the model of Maoz and Moav (1999).3 
Assuming that an individual’s surviving rate depends on health status, which improves with 
economic development, we show that the transitional dynamics of an economy depends on 
lifetime. If the increase in lifetime is sufficiently small, then the mobility and income inequality 
monotonically converge toward steady state, as in Maoz and Moav (1999). In contrast, if lifetime 
rapidly increases, then the economy exhibits cyclical behavior and even chaos in the economy. 
 In fact, in China which have experienced cyclical motion, life expectancy rose far more 
rapidly than that of Norway which have experienced monotonous motion. Between 1960 and 
2015, life expectancy increased from 42.4 to 74.6 years in China, while Norway’s life expectancy 
slowly increased from 71.4 to 80.5 (Source: OECD Health Statistics 2019). Hence, this paper 
indicates that the increase in lifetime may be one of the causes of various motions of the mobility 
that has been observed in developed countries. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 
analyzes the transitional dynamics of the economy. Section 4 expands the model with differential 
lifetime Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
Consider the competitive equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy. Each individual 
lives potentially for three periods, that is, “childhood”, “young adulthood,” and “old adulthood.” 
While individuals certainly live during the second period, survival into old adulthood is uncertain. 
 
2 In fact, demographic variables, such as fertility and lifetime, have a significant impact on the mobility 
and income inequality. Aso and Nakamura (2020) show that the fertility difference between the educated 
and uneducated plays a crucial role in the transitional dynamics of mobility. In addition, Strulik (2018) 
also explain the relationships between lifetime and social class. 
3 Maoz and Moav (1999) analyze the transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility, income 
inequality and economic development in simple framework. Thus, we can clearly show the effects of 
endogenous lifetime on the transitional dynamics of economy by incorporating it into Maoz and Moav 
(1999). 
 
2.1 Production and factor prices 
Following Owen and Weil (1998), we assume that aggregate output in period 𝑡 is characterized 
by the following production function: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐸𝑡(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝑈𝑡(1−𝛼)𝛽 , 𝐴 > 0, 0 < 𝛼 < 1, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, (1) 
where 𝐾𝑡 is the physical capital, 𝐸𝑡 is the number of educated workers, and 𝑈𝑡 is the number 
of uneducated workers. The total number of workers is normalized to unity and each supplies one 
unit of labor. Then, 𝐸𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡 = 1; therefore, the above production function can be written as per 
capita income; 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐸𝑡(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)(1 − 𝐸𝑡)(1−𝛼)𝛽. 
 To focus on human capital accumulation, as with Owen and Weil (1998), we assume 
that this model economy has a small open capital market, despite labor not being internationally 
mobile. Hence, the marginal product of physical capital is determined by the world interest rate ?̅?. Hence, we have the following in the equilibrium: 
 𝑤𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝛽)Θ𝐴(1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡 )𝛽 , (2) 
 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 𝛽Θ𝐴 (1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡 )𝛽−1, (3) 
where Θ = (1 − 𝛼)(𝛼 ?̅?⁄ )𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ ; the subscripts 𝑒 and 𝑢 denote “educated” and “uneducated,” 
respectively. Thus, the wage inequality becomes: 
 
𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 1 − 𝛽𝛽 (1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡 ). (4) 
To ensure that 𝑤𝑡𝑒 > 𝑤𝑡𝑢, we assume that 𝐸𝑡 < 1 − 𝛽. 
 
2.2 Individuals 
As a child, who does not work, the individual receives a transfer from her parent. It is used for 
consumption and possible education. When young, she works, and divides her income among 
consumption, savings, and a transfer for her children, regardless of the survival status during old 
age.4 She faces a survival probability from young to old adulthood. If she survives to old age, she 
retires and only consumes. The preference of individual 𝑖, born in period 𝑡, is expressed by the 
following expected lifetime utility function: 
 
4 The modeling of transfer follows Zhang et al. (2001). 
 𝑣𝑡𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 , (5) 
where 𝑖 ∈ {𝑒, 𝑢}; 𝑐𝑡𝑖 is consumption in period 𝑡, 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖  is consumption in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖  
is the transfer per child in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝜋𝑡+1 is the survival probability in period 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖  is consumption in period 𝑡 + 2. 
 Let ℎ𝑡𝑖  denote the education cost of individual 𝑖, born in period 𝑡. As with Maoz and 
Moav (1999), we assume an imperfect capital market that a child cannot access. Hence, individual 
uses up all the transfers from parents during childhood. A surviving individual will receive not 
only her own past savings plus interest, but also the return from mutual funds since we assume a 
perfect annuities market. Thus, individual 𝑖’s budget constraint becomes 
 𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖  , 𝜂𝑖 = { 1 if  individual 𝑖 acquires education 0 if   otherwise                                        (6.a) 
 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡+1𝑖  , 𝑅𝜋𝑡+1 𝑠𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖  , (6.b) 
where 𝑅 = 1 + ?̅?. Since we assume an imperfect capital market, the utility maximization in the 
periods of adulthood is formulated as follows: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 ,𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 ,𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑅 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 . 
The optimal consumption, transfer in period 𝑡 + 1, and optimal consumption in period 𝑡 + 2 
respectively become,  
 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1, 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 = 𝑅 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1. (7) 
Hence, the indirect utility function in adulthood is: 
 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ) = 2𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑅𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1]. (8) 
If the utility derived from investing in education is higher than or equal to the utility derived from 
not investing in education, then individual 𝑖 will acquire education. Thus we have, 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥𝑡𝑖 − ℎ𝑡𝑖) + 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 ) ≥ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑡𝑖 + 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 ), (9) 
From (9), we have the following critical value of education cost ℎ̂𝑡𝑖  for individual 𝑖 : 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )] = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1]. (10) 
 She acquires education if ℎ𝑡𝑖 ≤ ℎ̂𝑡𝑖 , and vice versa. As can be seen from (10), in addition to 
the wage inequality 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢⁄  and the transfer 𝑥𝑡𝑖 , the surviving rate 𝜋𝑡+1 also plays an 
important role in education choice. The higher the value of 𝜋𝑡+1 , the larger the incentive to 
acquire education since lifetime returns to education investment increases. From 𝑥𝑡𝑖 and (10), 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 = 𝑤𝑡𝑒2 + 𝜋𝑡 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1], ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 = 𝑤𝑡𝑢2 + 𝜋𝑡 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1]. (11) 
 
2.3 Education cost among individuals 
Following Maoz and Moav (1999), the following cost is assumed to be incurred for the education 
of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
 ℎ𝑡𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖𝑐(?̅?𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡), (12) 
where ?̅? = 𝐸𝑡𝑤𝑡𝑒 + (1 − 𝐸𝑡)𝑤𝑡𝑢 is a weighted average of educated and uneducated wages, 𝜃𝑖 
is a parameter representing individual 𝑖′𝑠 ability to learn; the higher the ability, the lower is the 
value of 𝜃𝑖. We further assume that 𝜃𝑖 is uniformly distributed in the interval (𝜃, 𝜃), regardless 
of the ability and class of the parents in any period. Hence, ℎ𝑡𝑖  is also uniformly distributed in 
the interval (ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡), where ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡) and ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡). 
 
2.4 Endogenous lifetime 
We assume that the probability of surviving 𝜋𝑡 depends on health status 𝐻𝑡; this relationship is 
represented as follows: 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋(𝐻𝑡) = 𝜋 + 𝜋𝐻𝑡𝛿1 + 𝐻𝑡𝛿 , (13) 
where 𝛿 > 0 ; 0 < 𝜋 ≤ 1 ; 0 < 𝜋 < 𝜋 ; 𝜋(0) = 𝜋 > 0 ; 𝜋′(𝐻) > 0 ; 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐻→∞ 𝜋(𝐻) = 𝜋 ≤ 1 ; 𝜋′′(𝐻) < 0 if 𝛿 ≤ 1 and 𝜋′′(𝐻) ⋛ 0, for any 𝐻 ⋚ ?̅? ≡ [(𝛿 − 1) (1 + 𝛿)⁄ ]1 𝛿⁄  if 𝛿 > 1. 
The parameter 𝛿 represents how an additional unit of health investment is transformed 
into greater lifetime through health technology. If 𝛿 ≤ 1, 𝜋𝑡 is a concave function. If 𝛿 > 1, 𝜋𝑡 is a S-shaped function, which means threshold effects exist (see Fanti and Gori, 2014). In 
other words, when 𝛿 < 1 , there is a relatively slow increase in economic development. In 
contrast, if 𝛿 > 1, lifetime suddenly and rapidly increases with economic development owing to 
the sudden effect. Hence, a larger 𝛿 increases the speed of converges from 𝜋 to 𝜋. Similar to 
Chen (2010), we assume that the health status 𝐻𝑡 is determined by economic development, i.e., 
per capita income 𝑌𝑡. 
 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻(𝑦𝑡) = 𝜙𝑌𝑡 , 𝜙 > 0, (14) 
where 𝜙 represents health productivity.  
 
3. Dynamics of the model 
In this section, we show the dynamics of the economy. Intergenerational mobility can be 
expressed in two ways—upward-mobility (𝑈𝑀𝑡) and downward-mobility (𝐷𝑀𝑡). In our model, 
upward-mobility means that individuals born to an uneducated parent become educated adults, 
while downward-mobility means that individuals born to an educated parent become uneducated 
adults. The dynamics of 𝐸𝑡 can therefore be expressed as: 
 𝐸𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡 = (1 − 𝐸𝑡) ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡⏟          ≡𝑈𝑀𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
ℎ𝑡 − ℎ̂𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡⏟      ≡𝐷𝑀𝑡  
(15) 
or 
 𝐸𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝐸𝑡) ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡  (16) 
Taking into account ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃𝑐(?̅?𝑡), ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃𝑐(?̅?𝑡) and Eq. (11), Eq. (16) can be written 
as follows: 
 𝐸𝑡+1 = 1[2 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)](𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1)𝑠(𝑤𝑡) − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃, (17) 
where 𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1) = [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒⁄ )2+𝜋(𝑌𝑡+1)] and 𝑠(𝑤𝑡) = 𝑐(𝑤𝑡) 𝑤𝑡⁄  represents the average 
income share of education cost.  
Investigating Eq. (17), we can see the dynamic behavior of intergenerational mobility, 
inequality, and economic development. Totally differentiating Eq. (17), 
 𝐺1𝑑𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝐺2𝑑𝐸𝑡, (18) 
where 
 𝐺1 = 1 − 1[2 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)](𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑓′(𝐸𝑡+1)𝑠(𝑤𝑡) , (19) 
 𝐺2 = −𝜀𝑡𝑠 + [𝜋(𝑌𝑡) 2 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)⁄ ]𝜀𝑡𝜋[2 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)](𝜃 − 𝜃)  𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1)𝑠(?̅?𝑡) 𝐸𝑡 ⋛ 0, (20) 
and 
 𝜀𝑡𝑠 = 𝜕𝑠(?̅?𝑡) 𝑠(?̅?𝑡)⁄𝜕𝐸𝑡 𝐸𝑡⁄ = 𝑠′(?̅?𝑡) ?̅?𝑡′  𝐸𝑡𝑠(?̅?𝑡) < 0, (21) 
 𝜀𝑡𝜋 = 𝜕𝜋(𝑌𝑡) 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)⁄𝜕𝐸𝑡 𝐸𝑡⁄ = 𝜋′(𝑌𝑡)𝑌𝑡′  𝐸𝑡𝜋(𝑌𝑡) > 0. (22) 𝜀𝑡𝑠  and 𝜀𝑡𝜋  represent the elasticity of education cost share with respect to the share of the 
educated in period 𝑡 and the elasticity of surviving rate with respect to the share of the educated 
in period 𝑡 , respectively. An increase in surviving rate 𝜋𝑡 decreases the transfer that is the 
funding source of education investment, and, therefore, discourages intergenerational mobility.  
 Since 𝐺1 > 0 , as is evident from Eq. (21) and (22), the transitional dynamics of 
intergenerational mobility depends on 𝜀𝑡𝑠 and 𝜀𝑡𝜋. Hence, we have 
 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝑑𝐸𝑡+1𝑑𝐸𝑡 ] = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝐺2𝐺1] = −𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)2 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡) 𝜀𝑡𝜋]. (23) 
 As educated workers increase, that is, the economy grows, the education cost share 
decreases, and 𝜀𝑡𝑠 < 0. In other words, the average wage increases more than the education cost. 
This reduction in education cost share encourages the mobility. On the other hand, lifetime 
increases with economic development, and 𝜀𝑡𝜋 > 0. This increase in lifetime decreases transfer 
from parents to children caused by higher savings, and, therefore discourages mobility. If increase 
in lifetime is sufficiently small, then 𝐺2 𝐺1 = −⁄ [𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)2+𝜋(𝑌𝑡) 𝜀𝑡𝜋] > 0 ; hence Eq. (18) is 
upwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane. In contrast, if increase in lifetime is sufficiently large, 
then 𝐺2 𝐺1 = −⁄ [𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜋(𝑌𝑡)2+𝜋(𝑌𝑡) 𝜀𝑡𝜋] < 0; hence, Eq. (18) is downwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) 
plane. Thus, we have the following proposition.5 
 
Proposition The transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility depends on two 
effects: the positive effect of a decrease in education cost share and the negative effect of an 
increase in lifetime. When the former is dominant, that is, increase in lifetime is sufficiently small, 
the mobility and income inequality monotonically approach the steady state, as in Maoz and Moav 
 
5 If surviving rate is an exogenous value, the transitional dynamics of mobility depends only on the 
education cost share as in Maoz and Moav (1999). 
(1999). In contrast, when the latter is dominant, that is, the increase in lifetime is sufficiently large, 
the mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical behavior. 
 
We show numerical examples of the Proposition. We take the parameter values 𝐴 = 12, 𝛼 = 0.3 , 𝛽 = 0.5 , 𝑟 = 0.05 , 𝜃 = 5 , 𝜃 = 1 , 𝜋 = 0.95 , 𝜋 = 0.3 , and 𝜙 = 0.1 .6 Fig.1 shows 
the transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility. Since increase in lifetime is sufficiently 
small, Eq. (18) is upwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane in Fig. 1(a). Thus, the mobility and 
lifetime monotonically increase toward the steady state, while income inequality decreases. In 
contrast, Fig. 1 (b) shows that Eq. (18) is downwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane since the 
increase in lifetime is sufficiently large. Hence, the mobility monotonically approaches economic 
development initially, and then exhibits cyclical behavior around the steady state. 
 This cyclical behavior of the mobility can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the 
educated 𝐸𝑡 is low, and hence education cost and lifetime are also low. Then, as the educated 
increases, the wage of an uneducated worker increases and upward-mobility occurs. Hence, the 
educated 𝐸𝑡 monotonically increases owing to upward-mobility. When 𝐸𝑡 exceeds a certain 
threshold, that is, economy is sufficiently developed, the lifetime increases rapidly. This sharp 
increase in lifetime raises the incentive for educational investment, even as it greatly decreases 
transfer. Since this decrease in transfer is dominant, an increase in lifetime impedes mobility. 
Whether 𝐸𝑡 increases or decreases in the next period depends on the positive effect of the decline 
in education cost share and the negative effect of increase in lifetime with economic development. 
Since the latter is larger than the former, 𝐸𝑡 decreases in the next period in Fig. 1 (b); this, in 
turn, decreases the lifetime and education cost, and, therefore, 𝐸𝑡 increases in the following 
period. This observation explains the cyclical behavior of economy.  
 
 [Insert Fig.1 around here] 
 
Numerical Result 1 Increase in lifetime with economic development plays a crucial role 
in the transitional dynamics of mobility. If the increase in lifetime with economic development is 
 
6 Except for 𝐴 and 𝜙, the parameters follow Fanti and Gori (2014), Maoz and Moav (1999), and Owen 
and Weil (1998). 
quite small, the mobility approaches toward steady state, as in Moaz and Moav (1999). In contrast, 
if increase in lifetime with economic development is sufficiently large, the mobility exhibits 
cyclical behavior around the steady state. 
 
In particular, if the decrease in education cost share is quite small and lifetime increases 
more suddenly and rapidly, the fluctuation is greater and even chaotic as can be shown in Fig. 2.7 
Since 𝛿 is greater, the lifetime increases more rapidly, and, then, greatly decreases the transfer. 
This rapid decrease in transfer deteriorate upward-mobility, while it promotes downward-mobility. 
Hence, larger 𝛿 generates larger fluctuations of economy and a chaotic equilibrium appears in 
the economy.  
 
[Insert Fig.2 around here] 
 
Numerical Result 2 If the decrease in education cost share is sufficiently small and 
lifetime increases rapidly, that is, the negative effect of an increase in lifetime is much larger than 
the positive effect of a decrease in the income share of education cost, the mobility, income 
inequality, and lifetime exhibit larger fluctuations and even a chaotic equilibrium. 
 
 
4. Expansion: Differential lifetime 
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of economy with differential lifetime between the 
educated and the uneducated. As can be indicated by OECD (2017), the educated workers have a 
longer lifetime than the uneducated workers. For simplicity, we assume that the surviving rate of 
the educated is enough high, i.e., 𝜋𝑡𝑒 = 𝜋𝑒 = ?̅? . Hence, only lifetime of uneducated workers 
increases with economic development, which depends on Eq. (14) and (15), i.e., 𝜋𝑢(𝑌𝑡). 
 From optimal allocation, we get the indirect utility function in adulthood of the educated 
and the uneducated.  
 
7 In addition to 𝛿, the parameters of education cost 𝑎 and 𝑏 is also important for determining 
transitional dynamics of mobility. The smaller the value of 𝑎 (larger 𝑏) is, the larger the value of 𝜀𝑡𝑠. It 
implies that income share of education cost decreases more slowly, and therefore the cyclical 
behavior exhibits in Fig. 2. 
 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ) = 2𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡𝑖] + 𝜋𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝑅𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡𝑖]. (24) 
Thus, we have the following critical value of education cost ℎ̂𝑡𝑖  for individual 𝑖: 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [  
 1 − (2 + 𝜋𝑒)2+𝜋𝑒(2 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑢 )2+𝜋𝑡+1𝑢⏟          (∗1) (
𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2 (𝑅𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝜋𝑡+1𝑢(𝑅𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )𝜋𝑒⏟        (∗2) ]  
  . (25) 
 From Eq.(25), in addition to 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢⁄  and 𝑥𝑡𝑖 , differential lifetime between the 
educated and the uneducated 𝜋𝑒 𝜋𝑡+1𝑢⁄  have two effects of incentives for acquiring education. 
Term (*1) presents decreasing the incentives by larger differential lifetime. In contrast, term (*2) 
presents that larger differential lifetime increases the incentives through the increase in lifetime 
returns to education investment. Hence, the effects of differential lifetime on the incentives for 
acquiring education is ambiguous.  
The dynamics of 𝐸𝑡 can therefore be expressed as: 
 𝐸𝑡+1 = ?̅?(𝐸𝑡 , 𝜋𝑒 , 𝜋𝑡𝑢)⏞        (∗3)(𝜃 − 𝜃)  𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1, 𝜋𝑒 , 𝜋𝑡+1𝑢 )⏞          
(∗5)
𝑐(𝑤𝑡)⏟  (∗4) − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃, (26) 
where ?̅?(𝐸𝑡 , ?̅?, 𝜋𝑡𝑢)  represents a weighted average of educated and uneducated transfer for 
children, ?̅?(𝐸𝑡 , 𝜋𝑒 , 𝜋𝑡𝑢) =  𝐸𝑡𝑏𝑡𝑒(𝑤𝑡𝑒 , 𝜋𝑒) + (1 − 𝐸𝑡)𝑏𝑡𝑢(𝑤𝑡𝑢, 𝜋𝑡𝑢). The dynamics of 𝐸𝑡 depends 
on terms (*3), (*4) and (*5). Term (*3) presents changes in average transfer, while Term (*4) and 
(*5) present the effects increase in education cost and change in the incentives for acquiring 
education through income inequality and differential lifetime on the mobility. 
 Using the same parameter values in Section 4; 𝐴 = 12, 𝛼 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 0.05, 𝜃 = 5, 𝜃 = 1, 𝜋 = 0.95, 𝜋 = 0.3, and 𝜙 = 0.1, we show examples of dynamics of 𝐸𝑡. As can 
be seen from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we get the main results even if we consider differential lifetime.8 
As a result, although differential lifetime generates the incentive for acquiring education, it does 
not play a crucial role in the main results of this paper. In other words, decrease in upward-
mobility by increasing in lifetime of the uneducated is an important factor in the dynamics of 𝐸𝑡. 
 
8 Since the lifetime of the educated is constant in section 4, increase in lifetime is smaller than section 3, 
i.e., 𝜀𝑡𝜋 is small. Hence, to get the same result of chaos equilibrium as section3, we set up the 
larger value of 𝛿, 𝑏, and the smaller value of 𝑎. In other words, the existence of chaos 
equilibrium requires a more rapid increase in lifetime and a smaller decrease in education cost 
share in differential lifetime model . 
 
[Insert Fig.3 and 4 around here] 
 
Numerical Result 3 Even if we suppose that differential lifetime, i.e., the educated 
workers have a longer lifetime than the uneducated workers, we get two motions of mobility: 




This paper studies the impacts of endogenous lifetime on intergenerational mobility and economic 
development in overlapping generations framework. Increase in lifetime has two effects on the 
mobility: the positive effect through increasing incentive of educational investment and the 
negative effect through decreasing transfer for children. These effects of lifetime play crucial role 
in determining transitional dynamics of economy. 
Two motions of intergenerational mobility, monotonous and cyclical, have been shown 
in empirical studies. This paper explains the two motions caused by the lifetime mechanism. We 
show that the transitional dynamics of mobility depends on lifetime. When an increase in lifetime 
is quite small, the mobility and income inequality monotonically approach the steady state with 
economic development, as in Maoz and Moav (1999). In contrast, when an increase in lifetime is 
sufficiently large, the economy exhibits cyclical and chaotic behavior. In fact, China where 
lifetime increased rapidly, has experienced a cyclical motion of mobility, while monotonous 
motion has been observed in Norway where lifetime slowly increased. 
 In future research, we can analyze the positive effect of an increase in lifetime on  
economic development by incorporating health capital into the model. Considering this will 
make it more interesting to explore interactions. In addition, available evidence is limited and it 
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(a) 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓, 𝜺𝒕𝒔 + 𝜺𝒕𝝅 < 𝟎 
(𝐸∗ = 0.2780, 𝜋∗ = 0.6429) (b) 𝜹 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝜺𝒕𝒔 + 𝜺𝒕𝝅 > 𝟎 (𝐸∗ = 0.2605, 𝜋∗ = 0.8072) 
Fig.1 Transitional dynamics of 𝑬𝒕 (𝒂 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟐, 𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓) 
(a) Transitional dynamics of 𝑬𝒕 (b) Fluctuations in 𝑬𝒕 and 𝝅𝒕 





(a) 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓 
(𝐸∗ = 0.2646, 𝜋𝑢∗ = 0.6410) (b) 𝜹 = 𝟏𝟎 (𝑬∗ = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓𝟑𝟖, 𝝅𝒖∗ = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟗𝟕𝟓) 
Fig.3 Transitional dynamics of 𝑬𝒕 (𝒂 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟐, 𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓) 
(a) Transitional dynamics of 𝑬𝒕 (b) Fluctuations in 𝑬𝒕 and 𝝅𝒕𝒖 
Fig.4 Chaos equilibrium (𝜹 = 𝟑𝟖, 𝒂 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟓, 𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟐) 
